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Introduction

Palestine and Israel have a long history of conflict. While the actual state of Israel is a small region geographically, the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians is a large part of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict has prevented both parties from fully cooperating to achieve a peace agreement. Because conflict in the region has been fueled by mistrust and fear, any attempt to reach a genuine peace deal has failed. This idea that states are motivated by fear and distrust originally stems from the realist school of thought. The theories examined in this paper will deal with the factors that cause states to fear and distrust one another, as well as the motivations for power and security acquisition. It will examine how sovereignty affects state’s abilities to achieve peace and how changing norms affect state intervention. Each of these theories will be explained in relation to the ongoing conflict in the Palestine-Israel region.

Literature Review

According to Martha Finnemore, a prominent constructivist theorist for International Relations whose research focuses on global governance, international organizations, ethics, and social theory, humanitarian intervention is not an infringement on national sovereignty, but an evolving norm guided by social forces. As states justify their intervention, the norm for intervention is reinforced, causing states to intervene more frequently. In order to discuss the evolving process of state intervention, we must first define ‘intervention’ and distinguish it from UN relief. Humanitarian intervention is the “use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect civilians of the target state from large-scale human rights violations” while humanitarian UN relief is “best characterized
as simply a ‘collective use of force’ under the charter.”¹ In her theory, Finnemore states, “When states justify their interventions, they are drawing on and articulating shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states. It is literally an attempt to connect one’s actions to standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior. As shared understandings about who is ‘human’ and about how intervention to protect those people must be carried out change, behavior shifts accordingly.”² Therefore, her explanation about how humanitarian intervention is executed is dependent on the shared understanding among states about who is “human” and about how intervention to protect these people must be carried out. In the cases of the Iraqi suppression of Kurds and Shiites, widespread starvation and political chaos in Somalia, and political unrest in Cambodia, Finnemore examined how humanitarian and UN intervention had occurred even though there was no obvious national interest at stake for the states intervening militarily.³ While she has examined several cases involving third party intervention, Finnemore has yet to examine how intervention in Palestine has shaped the nation in the past or how future intervention could possible change the tense relations in the region for the future.

Joseph Grieco is a professor of Political Science at Duke University whose work includes research on theories of international relations, issues of international political economy, and problems of international conflict. His essay, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," argues that liberal institutionalism, which asserts that despite international anarchy international institutions can help states achieve cooperation, misconstrues the realist analysis of the inhibiting effects of anarchy on the willingness of states to cooperate. Unlike Finnemore, who believes that states are capable of humanitarian intervention, with no ulterior motive for self-interests, Greico argues that states are driven by the need for power and security.  

According to Grieco, "...States in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests." Therefore, his explanation about whether states will cooperate in the face of common interests depends on whether they are preoccupied with power and security.  

In his same essay, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," Joseph Grieco also reasons that in addition to being preoccupied with power and security, states are also motivated by fear and distrust. According to him, “...some states may sometimes be driven by greed or ambition, but anarchy and the danger of war cause all states always to be motivated in some measure

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5 Grieco, Joseph, M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism."
by fear and distrust.” If states exist in a state of anarchy where the danger of war is real, then states’ actions will be motivated by fear and distrust. In order to support his arguments about state behavior, Grieco examines the Prisoner’s Dilemma which goes “In the game, each state prefers mutual cooperation to mutual noncooperation (CC>DD), but also successful cheating to mutual cooperation (DC>CC) and mutual defection to victimization by another’s cheating (DD>CD); overall, then, DC>CC>DD>CD. In these circumstances, and in the absence of a centralized authority or some countervailing force to bind states to their promises, each defects regardless of what it expects the other to do.”

According to Grieco, for realists, anarchy means that states are theoretically capable of cooperation, but the knowledge that cheating is both possible and profitable, and the lack of a supranational authority to enforce state promises, prevents cooperation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma could be applied to the case of Palestine and Israel today. While both sides may benefit from a peace agreement, neither side is willing to do so out of both mistrust of the other party and unwillingness to lose power.

Hans J. Morgenthau is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the realist school in the 20th century. In his book *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau claims that due to the inherently flawed nature of humans, states tend to pursue self-interests. Therefore, the primary objective of diplomacy is the advancement of their national interests through peaceful means. International peace can be strengthened through the surrender of partial sovereignty by states to a higher authority. He states that, “It is only when nations have surrendered to a higher authority the means of destruction which

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6 Grieco, Joseph, M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism."
7 Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy And The Limits Of Cooperation: A Realist Critique Of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism."
modern technology has put in their hands — when they have given up their sovereignty — that international peace can be made as secure as domestic peace. Diplomacy can make peace more secure than it is today, and the world state can make peace more secure than it would be if nations were to abide by the rules of diplomacy.\(^8\) His explanation for how the world can achieve a lasting, stable peace, relies on states’ willingness to give up some of their sovereignty to an international force. His theory about lessening state sovereignty stems from his personal experience during the Cold War, where he favored supranational control of nuclear weapons.\(^9\) While his theory dates back to 1948, the idea of relinquishing partial state authority to an international body is still very relevant today, especially in the case of Palestine and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The issues of conflict resolution and peace preservation have been debated among theorists for years. The Realist school of thought asserts that anarchy and the threat of violence causes states to fear and distrust one another, which causes them to then focus on increasing their power and security, which only leads to more conflict. In order to stop the cycle of violence between states, Morgenthau proposes that states delegate partial sovereignty to a higher authority. The Constructivist Norm Theory states that the international community is unwilling to intervene in a humanitarian crisis when they do not view the victims as ‘human.’ While these theories differ in their major and minor premises, they all are formulated around the central question: under what conditions will states relinquish sovereignty or cooperate to intervene?

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<th>Theory quote with citation</th>
<th>Major premise</th>
<th>Minor premise</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
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<td>“When states justify their interventions, they are drawing on and articulating shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states. It is literally an attempt to connect one’s actions to standards of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior. As shared understandings about who is “human” and about how intervention to protect these people must be carried out change, then behavior of states must shift accordingly.”(^{10})</td>
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\(^{10}\) Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics
| "...States in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests."¹¹ | If states are preoccupied with power and security, then they fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests. | States are preoccupied with power and security. | They fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests. |
| "...Some states may sometimes be driven by greed or ambition, but anarchy and the danger of war cause all states always to be motivated in some measure by fear and distrust."¹² | If there is anarchy, which causes the danger of war to be real, then states will be motivated in some measure by fear and distrust. | There is anarchy which causes the danger of war to be real. | States will be motivated in some measure by fear and distrust. |
| "It is only when nations have surrendered to a higher authority the means of destruction which modern technology has put in their hands — when they have given up their sovereignty — that international peace can be made as secure as domestic peace. Diplomacy can make peace more secure than it is today, and the world state can make peace more | If nations surrender to a higher authority the means of destruction which modern technology has put in their hands — when they have given up their sovereignty, then international peace can be made as secure as domestic peace. | Nations surrender to a higher authority the means of destruction which modern technology has put in their hands — when they have given up their sovereignty | International peace can be made as secure as domestic peace. |

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¹¹ Grieco, Joseph, M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism."

¹² Grieco, Joseph, M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism."
secure than it would be if nations were to abide by the rules of diplomacy.”

Methodology

The majority of evidence I collected to support my conclusion came from electronic primary sources, such as BBC News, the Guardian, and the ICC website. In addition, I also used secondary sources, such as monographs and peer-reviewed articles, along with their footnotes and endnotes, to examine the various theories included in my paper. During my research, I used strategic keywords to find articles and news sources related to my topic. These keywords included names of international organizations, such as the ICC, UNESCO, and UNSC, combined with names of states, such as Palestine and Israel. The database I created was comprised of 100 events that were gathered from various articles and arranged chronologically. This chronology was then used to find precedents that supported the conclusion.

Humanitarian Intervention

According to Martha Finnemore’s Norm Theory, the willingness of states to intervene on the basis of humanitarian rights is dependent upon how states view the victims of the humanitarian crises. When states view the victims as ‘human,’ then they are more likely to intervene. Therefore, if shared understandings about who is ‘human’ and about how intervention to protect those people must be carried out change, then state

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behavior shifts accordingly.14 With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the international community agreed upon what fundamental human rights were.15 This doctrine along with various international military tribunals led the international community to adopt the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC) on July 17, 1998.16 After its creation the ICC began to intervene in domestic human rights violation cases when the national court system failed to provide a genuine trial. 17

Palestine presents a special case for the ICC, as it has been reluctant to intervene due to its occupied nature, despite numerous attempts to convince the court to open an investigation. In 2008, the Republic of Yemen called upon the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to refer to the ICC Israeli leaders who were accused of committing human rights violations during the three week armed conflict.18 Following the inaction of the UNSC, in January 2009, The Palestinian Authority’s justice minister filed a declaration with the ICC requesting an investigation into the “acts committed on the

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Finally after three years of consideration, in April 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC declared it would not open a preliminary investigation into the conflict because Article 12 of the Rome Statue maintains that “only a ‘state’ could confer jurisdiction on the court and deposit an instrument of accession with the UN secretary general.” Therefore, because in 2012, Palestine only held ‘observer’ status at the UN, and not ‘non member state’ status, the ICC refused to look into their case. Following this rejection, on November 29, 2012, the UN General Assembly voted to award Palestine non-member observer status in the UN.

Two years after the Palestinian Authority’s appeal to the ICC, in an open letter to the UNSC, Amnesty International urged its members to “take effective steps to address the extremely grave human rights and humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and Israel” by referring the situation to the ICC as well as taking other actions including “imposing a comprehensive arms embargo, to address the crisis.”

Because of Palestine’s enhanced status at the UN, on January 1, 2015, the Palestinian Authority “acceded to the court’s founding treaty and recognised its

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jurisdiction dating back to the eve of last summer’s Gaza war.” Then on January 16, 2015, failing to adhere to past precedents regarding Occupied Palestine, the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, decided to launch a preliminary investigation to examine possible war crimes that may have been committed in Occupied Palestine during the 2014 Gaza War.

The precedent for non-intervention in Occupied Palestine by the ICC dates back to over a decade. The recent decision by ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda to open a preliminary investigation into the region defies its own set practice. This move reaffirms Martha Finnemore’s theory about norm intervention. Her theory states that as the common understanding about who deserves protection and aid change, intervention practices adjust accordingly. With Palestine receiving ‘non-member observer’ status at the UN, along with the acceptance of 14 other treaties including the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions, the way the international community views the Palestinians has changed, seeing them as more ‘human.’ This change has led to an alteration in the way intervention takes place in the region.

_Fear and Distrust_

Unlike Finnemore who focuses on how state behavior affects humanitarian intervention, Joseph Grieco focuses on how the threat of war affects state behavior.

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According to Grieco, “...some states may sometimes be driven by greed or ambition, but anarchy and the danger of war cause all states always to be motivated in some measure by fear and distrust.” If a state feels there is a threat to their security, then it will be motivated by both fear and distrust. This principle has prevented both Palestine and Israel from reaching a true peace agreement.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there have been many attempts to negotiate a peace treaty. After the First Intifada, where Palestinians rebelled against Israeli occupation in 1987, killing nearly 1,300 Palestinians and 160 Israelis, the need for peace negotiation became more apparent. One of the most famous peace negotiations was the Oslo Accords. The accords started in 1993, behind closed doors, in Oslo Norway. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, acting without a mediator, came together to draft up a set of agreements in hope of ending the long lasting conflict. The Oslo Accords were set up in a two-phase timetable. According to the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement: 1993, Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations, the first phase of the agreement would consist of a five year interim period where upon Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and slowly out of parts of the West Bank. Also the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) would police the territories they controlled.

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26 Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy And The Limits Of Cooperation: A Realist Critique Of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism."
and cooperate with Israel in the fight against terrorism. After the five-year period, the second phase of the agreement was designed to permanently resolve the more complex issues, such as refugee status, borders, and Jerusalem. Following the five-year interim period, despite attempts to reach a permanent peace solution, an agreement was never made and the accords ultimately failed.

Despite serious attempts to negotiate, neither party was able to cooperate fully. Israel accused Arafat and the Palestinian forces of not being committed to peace or seriously trying to stop militant groups who opposed the peace process. In a speech given by Yasser Arafat, the PLO Chairman, in a mosque in Johannesburg, South Africa, he said “This agreement, I am not considering it more than the agreement which had been signed between our prophet Mohammed and Koraish, and you remember the Caliph Omar had refused this agreement and [considered] it a despicable truce. But Mohammed had accepted it and we are accepting now this peace offer. But to continue our way to Jerusalem, to the first shrine together and not alone. We are in need of you as

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31 "Shattered Dreams of Peace." PBS.
33 "Shattered Dreams of Peace." PBS
34 The agreement with Koraish allowed Mohammed to pray in Mecca, which was under Koraish control, for ten years. When Mohammed grew stronger two years later, he abrogated the agreement, slaughtered the tribe of Koraish and conquered Mecca.
Moslems, as warriors of Jihad.”

Similarly, Palestinians also saw Israel as not fully committed to the accords. They accused Israel of failing to stop the building and expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and stalling on the agreed withdrawal from the area. According to Al Jazeera America, while the resolution to the settlement issue was meant to be negotiated permanently after the five year interim period was over, “In the 20 years since Oslo, however, Israel's settler population in the occupied territories has more than doubled — from roughly 270,000 in 1993 to well over 560,000 today [2013]— even as the parties were ostensibly negotiating the fate of these areas.”

According to Grieco, the reason for the failure of the Oslo Accords would be the threat of war, which caused both parties to act out of fear and distrust, preventing any real solution from being made. The First Intifada was a grassroots uprising that killed over 1,000 people. Since then there was a Second Intifada, which started in 2000 and was much bloodier and more violent than the first. Grieco would see the two intifadas as evidence that the threat of war in the Israeli-Palestinian region is real. Even during the

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Oslo peace negotiations, deeper and deeper mistrust grew on both sides\(^39\), causing the accords to fail, and violence to plague the region until this day.

*Power and Security*

According to Joseph Grieco, "...States in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests." Building off of his last theory, when states feel threatened they build up their security, which causes them to fail to cooperate, which will ultimately lead to more violence.

In 2012 Israel spent 15,536,000,000 USD on their military, about 6.2% of the country’s GDP. That is more than three of its bordering neighbors Lebanon ($1,622 million), Jordan ($1,382 million), and Egypt (4,175) spent in 2012 combined.\(^40\) In addition to a large military budget, the nuclear program of Israel, which is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), became public news when a former speaker of the Knesset, Avraham Burg, declared Israeli possession of both nuclear and chemical weapons, describing the classified policy as “outdated and childish.”\(^41\) Israel also has mandatory military service for both men and women. It is the only country in the world that maintains compulsory military service for women. It has one of the highest


recruitment rates in the world, around 80% of those who are summoned serve. Market Business News recently reported on the 2012 National Power Index (NPI) that Israel ranked tenth on the list of the world’s most powerful countries with a 32.19 NPI ranking. The list was released by the Foundation for National Security and Research (FNSR), a New Delhi based think tank.

Since Israel withdrew from the ICC on August 28, 2002, its support for the court has been minimal. After the ICC Prosecutor decided to open a preliminary investigation into the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict during the summer of 2014, Israel’s former foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, described how Israel would combat the ICC investigation during a meeting with Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird. Lieberman states that if “Israel does not see a ‘dramatic change’ in the ICC position, ‘we will ask all our friends to stop any funding of the ICC.” A similar incident in 2011 occurred when both Israel and the US cut funding to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) after its decision by world governments to grant Palestine UNESCO membership. Both Israel and the US lose their UNESCO voting rights on November 8, 2013 after the deadline to repay their debts to the organization passed.

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According to Grieco’s theory, Israel’s preoccupation with power and security has prevented them from cooperating with other international organizations, even when it would be in their mutual benefit. Israel’s massive military spending and mandatory conscription for service demonstrates the Israeli government’s preoccupation with power and security. This has caused them to pull out of many international treaties and organizations such as UNESCO and the ICC. Israel and Palestine have been locked in this self-serving cycle of violence, which according to Grieco, will continue until genuine cooperation is achieved.

Pooling of Sovereignty

According to Morgenthau, “It is only when nations have surrendered to a higher authority the means of destruction which modern technology has put in their hands — when they have given up their sovereignty — that international peace can be made as secure as domestic peace. Diplomacy can make peace more secure than it is today, and the world state can make peace more secure than it would be if nations were to abide by the rules of diplomacy.”47 Because Morgenthau’s theory claims that if states give up partial sovereignty, then peace will prevail, it is logical to assume that if states refuse to delegate some of their sovereignty to a supernatural authority, then peace will remain insecure. As previously mentioned, Israel has a long history of either abstaining from or pulling out of international treaties and organizations.

After Israel and the United States cut their funding to UNESCO in 2011, the


organization underwent a financial crisis that “forced it to cut or scale back US-led initiatives such as Holocaust education and tsunami research.”

While UNESCO is predominately known for the preservation of heritage and support for cultural diversity, it also works to mobilize education, advance scientific cooperation, and protect the freedom of expression. In addition to serious cut backs to educational programs, according to the Guardian, “Some fear that a weaker US presence will lead to growing anti-Israeli sentiment within Unesco, where Arab-led criticism of Israel for territorial reasons has long been an issue.”

The organization has already been forced to cut funding to a program in Iraq, which would have helped to restore water facilities, and may also have to also cut a Holocaust and genocide awareness program in Africa. This loss would be a particular blow to the US and Israel because after the US rejoined UNESCO in 2002, Holocaust awareness was one of the areas it had aggressively promoted.

By pulling out of UNESCO, Israel is not only hurting themselves, but also demonstrating to the international community its unwillingness to cooperate. By cutting funding to UNESCO, Israel and the US, caused cutbacks to educational programs, including Holocaust awareness programs. These cutbacks could contribute to anti-Israel sentiments within UNESCO, which may cause international tension. While cooperating...

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with the organization would be beneficial to Israel and the US, both countries chose to not support it, without regard to the consequences.

**Conclusion**

Throughout history, foreign relations have been a driving factor for state behavior. The struggle to cooperate and achieve peace between nations is an ongoing issue today. Grieco’s analysis of cooperation between states depends on whether there is a threat of war between the two entities. This threat causes states to fear and distrust one another which eventually leads to conflict. This conflict in turn causes states to become preoccupied with power and security, which leads to states to oppose cooperation, which ultimately causes more conflict. In the case of Palestine and Israel, the intifadas serve as proof of a threat of war. This threat prevented states from fully cooperating during the Oslo Accords peace process, causing the accords to fail. Due the violent nature of the conflict in the region, especially the second intifada, Israel became preoccupied with power and security, which led to more noncooperation and has caused the region to be plagued with violence today.

Building on Grieco’s argument, Morgenthau believes that the solution to achieving international peace is for states to willing surrender partial sovereignty. As a result of the threat of war and the preoccupation with power, Israel has been unwilling to delegate some of its sovereignty to an international entity. However, unlike Israel, the Palestinian Authority has been delegating more and more of its ‘sovereignty’ to international organizations, such as the ICC. According to Finnemore, this surrender of sovereignty has led the international community to view Palestine as a more legitimate
state, which has caused it to warrant international attention and intervention.

In order to break the cycle of violence and non-cooperation in the region, both parties must first overcome the obstacle of fear and distrust. Because the Realist school of thought assumes that the world is in anarchy, which causes the threat of war to be legitimate, states must accept that the threat is there and work towards cooperation despite any distrust. This could help prevent the aspiration to increase power and security, which has the potential to give states a better chance of achieving peace. Further research should be done about the affect surrendering sovereignty has on eliminating mistrust between parties. If Palestine and Israel work to genuinely cooperate in forming a peace agreement, an end to the long history of violence may be possible.


http://militarybudget.org/israel/.


